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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
ALFRED T. SMURTHWAITE,

APPELLANT' S
REPLY BRIEF

Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vCase No. 86 0399
Category 13b.

JOHN PAINTER,
Defendant-Respondent.
ooOoo

ARGUMENT
POINT I
MR. PAINTER'S "STATEMENT OF FACTS"
IS, IN CERTAIN IMPORTANT PARTICULARS,
INACCURATE AND MISLEADING.
1.

Mr. Painter would apparently have the Court draw the

inference, from points denominated 2, 3, and 9 of his "Statement of Facts" (Respondent's Brief at 1-4), that Mr. Smurthwaite
expected nothing from Mr. Painter other than a place for his
horses to stay.

Mr. Smurthwaite concedes, as he forthrightly

acknowledged at trial, that he expected Mr. Painter neither to
feed the horses nor to go out of his way actively to inspect
them.

That acknowledgment does not, however, lead inexorably

to the conclusion that Mr. Smurthwaite expected nothing by way
of care from Mr. Painter.

The essence of Mr. Smurthwaite's

testimony with respect to his expectations is that he expected
Mr. Painter to exercise at least a modicum of sensory concern
and, when reasonably necessary, promptly to communicate his

actual knowledge of developments that might significantly
endanger the well-being of the horses:
He would call me. He would notify me if
any horse was sick, if any horse was
injured, if any mare was having her colt
. . . . [I]f the horses needed anything,
all he had to do was call and I could come
up and take care of whatever emergency was
existing.
Tr., Vol. II, at 31;
Q.

But there was no requirement that
[Mr. Painter] actually get out into this
pasture and walk up and inspect horses
there.

A.

Well, other than that he said he would look
after them.

Id. at 76-77;
A.

. . . If [Mr. Painter] wasn't going to tell
me about my horses, I wouldn't pasture 70
miles away [round-trip].

Id. at 93.

2.

Point 4 of Mr. Painter's "Statement of Facts" (Respon-

dent's Brief at 2) contains what appears to be an erroneous
statement of law:
At all times Smurthwaite had complete access to
and control over his own horses in connection
with . . . taking horses away from the subject
pasturage.
As pointed out at page 15 of Appellant's Brief, Utah Code
Annotated §38-2-1, the "agistors' lien" statute, provides a
lien right for those who, among other things, pasture animals
for others and expressly allows them to retain possession of
animals pastured until payment is made for amounts due pursuant

to such pasturing arrangements.

As is also pointed out at

page 15 of Appellant's Brief and as appears clearly from the
record (Tr., Vol. II, at 56-58, 244-45, 268; Tr., Vol. Ill, at
17), Mr. Smurthwaite was in arrears on his payment obligation
when the horses died.
Furthermore, inasmuch as Mr. Painter himself asserted
(with respect to Mr. Smurthwaite1s surviving horses) his
agistor's (or pasturer's) lien right, it is not at all clear
that Mr. Painter would have allowed Mr. Smurthwaite to remove
the horses from the land.

3.

Point 5 of Mr. Painter's "Statement of Facts" (Respon-

dent's Brief at 2) might, if unexplained, cause the reader to
conclude that Mr. Smurthwaite had, for sustenance purposes,
"fed" his horses.

There is simply no factual or record sup-

port for that proposition, either at the places cited by
Mr. Painter or elsewhere.

The only "feeding" that

Mr. Smurthwaite did, while the horses that died were kept on
Mr. Painter's land, was incidental feeding that was done in
furtherance of inspection and "re-acquaintance" purposes.
See, e.g., Tr., Vol. II, at 44-45.

This fact is important in

light of (1) the fact that the horses ultimately died of starvation; (2) the fact that the horses had not required supplemental feed in addition to the naturally available pasturage
in the two winters previous to the one during which they died;
(3) the fact that Mr. Smurthwaite testified that he thought

that Mr. Painter would notify him if the horses needed supplemental feed (see, e.g., Tr., Vol. II, at 30, 31, 35; Vol. Ill,
At 68-69); and (4) the fact that the failure of communication
concerning the horses1 need for feed was and remains at the
very heart of this dispute.
Point 5 might also cause the reader to conclude that
Mr. Smurthwaite1s failure to inspect his horses subsequent
to early December 1983 was arbitrary or unreasonable.

As

Mr. Smurthwaite explained at trial, however, Mr. Painter had
by then earned his trust (or so he thought) and
It was not a breeding season. It was not a
foaling season. I had two winters to believe
that they would survive. I had Mr. Painter's
word that he would let me know if anything
happened. Why drive 70 miles just to look at
the snow and the horses[?]
Tr., Vol. II, at 93.

4.

Point 7 of Mr. Painter's "Statement of Facts" (Respon-

dent's Brief at 3) appears to stem from his misunderstanding
of Mr. Smurthwaite's position concerning timing of the expected
(by Mr. Smurthwaite) moving (by Mr. Painter) of the horses
from the lower pasture to the upper pasture (where the tall
crested wheat grass grew (Tr., Vol. II, at 219) and where other
horses - those belonging to Mr. Robert Child - survived the
winter (Tr., Vol. II, at 271)).

As Mr. Smurthwaite testified,

his concern with the location of his horses ("upper" versus
"lower" pasture) was tied not to dates but to snow cover and

feed availability, and, as of the last time he saw his horses,
in December of 1983, when they were in the lower pasture,
"[t]here was no snow on the ground, there was plenty of feed."
Tr., Vol. II, at 95.

5.

Point 8 of Mr. Painter's "Statement of Facts" (Respon-

dent's Brief at 3) might, if unexplained, allow the inference
to be drawn that the plowed "Sewer Company" road extended down
into the area in the lower pasture where the horses dwindled
and died.

The important facts here are:

(1) that that road

was not plowed beyond a certain locked gate and did not allow
meaningful access to the horses; and (2) that it was thus not
reasonable for Mr. Painter to think that Mr. Smurthwaite was
"checkin' on" (and, presumably, feeding) the horses, given the
illusory nature of that "access," a road which was, in fact,
no more likely to have been utilized than was the roadway which
ran right past Mr. Painter's house and barn, the roadway which
Mr. Smurthwaite had previously invariably or almost invariably
used in the past, the roadway from which Mr. Painter had to
use his tractor to remove the snow so that Mr. Smurthwaite's
truck could get even remotely close to the horses.
Tr., Vol. II, at 246.
POINT II
THE RELEVANT CASE LAW DOES NOT SUPPORT
THE DISTRICT COURT'S DETERMINATION OR
MR. PAINTER'S POSITION THAT THE
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES WAS NOT
AN AGISTMENT BAILMENT.

See, e.g.,

Mr. Smurthwaite respectfully contends that both the District
Court and Mr. Painter have read the body of common law incorrectly
and too narrowly in, respectively, determining and arguing that
the arrangement between Messrs. Smurthwaite and Painter did
not constitute an agistment bailment agreement.
Mr. Painter appears to rely heavily on the obiter dictum
statement in Cox v. Pithoud, 271 Cal.App.2d 571, 34 Cal.Rptr.
582 (Cal.App. 1963) that the landowner there M. . . was not
merely leasing pasture to [the animal owner] . . . ."

34 Cal.

Rptr. at 583. Mr. Painter also seeks to distinguish the facts
of the cases he cites from the facts underlying the instant
dispute.

Mr. Smurthwaite readily concedes that the facts of

this case are not identical to the facts of those any of the
cases cited by Mr. Painter but points out that, when the facts
of any given dispute are carefully compared with those of any
other, there is seldom, if ever, complete identity between the
two sets of facts.

The interesting thing is that in none of

the cases discussed by Mr. Painter was an agistment bailment
analysis made and rejected; contrariwise, the agistment relationship was found to exist in all the cases.
Mr. Smurthwaite contends that, as a matter of general
common law (discussed at pages 9-12 of Appellant's Brief), an
agistment bailment agreement existed between himself and
Mr. Painter.

And the law of Utah, given the above-referenced

agistors' lien statute (Utah Code Annotated §38-2-1), which
includes express reference to pasturing arrangements, clearly

favors Mr. Smurthwaite1s position, especially, perhaps, in
light of Mr. Painter's own ultimate reliance on his possessionretention right secured by that statute.

Additionally, and as

Mr. Painter appears to have recognized, Utah case law itself
provides support for Mr. Smurthwaite1s position.

At page 9 of

Respondent's Brief, Mr. Painter himself describes the agreement
between the parties in Hughes v. Yardley, 19 Utah 2d 166, 428
P.2d 158 (1967), as follows:
The defendants agreed to take cattle owned by
plaintiff onto defendant's ranch and pasture
them from May 1, 1964 to October 1, 1964.
(Emphasis added.)
Page 9 of Respondent's Brief concludes with the following
analysis:
In none of the cases cited by Appellant is
there really an issue as to the existence of a
bailment. The existence of a bailment was
clear because in each of the cases there was a
taking into custody by the bailee and caring
for the animals, usually for a specified term.
In each of the cited cases the parties expressly
agreed to terms which constituted a bailment
and the bailee was aware of his duty to care
for the animals.
Hughes v. Yardley was one of the "cases cited by Appellant,"
and, Mr. Smurthwaite submits, the only difference between his
agreement with Mr. Painter and that of the parties in Hughes
v. Yardley is that here the agreement was on a month-to-month
basis (see, e.g., Record at 95), whereas there the agreement
was for a five-month period.

Mr. Smurthwaite suggest that,

inasmuch as both agreements were for specific terms, the distinction is one that is without legal significance.

CONCLUSION
It is perhaps noteworthy that Mr. Painter has offered, in
his Brief, no response to the important public policy concerns
raised by Mr. Smurthwaite (Appellant's Brief at 13-14; 16-17).
It is certainly noteworthy that Mr. Smurthwaite had put 12 or
13 years of his life into building up his racing Appaloosa
breeding program; that his expert estimated the broodmares and
their unborn foals to have a value of approximately $94,000.00
at the time or times of their deaths (Tr., Vol. I, at 57-80;
Exhibit X); and that there was no evidence adduced that
Mr. Smurthwaite was mentally impaired while his horses were
starving to death.

All reasonable inferences point toward the

very reasonableness of Mr. Smurthwaitefs conduct and the unreasonableness of Mr. Painter's.

An agistment bailment agreement

clearly existed and, whether the "lack-of-substantial-evidence"
standard or the "clearly erroneous" standard of appellate review
is applied, Mr. Smurthwaite is entitled to reversal and remand.
Respectfully submitted this
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